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Frank Cross's paper on ``Legal Implications of Hormesis'' offers a provocative starting point for an
important discussion. Contrary to the frequent
assumption that accepting the evidence of hormesis
( benefits at low doses) must invite less stringent
regulation, Cross shows that, compared to a linear
dose ± response relationship, a hormetic (J -shaped )
dose ± response curve could justify less stringent
regulation in some cases, but more stringent regulation in other cases. Hormesis weakens the case for
regulation at low exposure levels, because zero
exposure would actually entail more harm to public
health than some low level of exposure. Cross
explains, however, that hormesis also strengthens
the case for regulation at high exposure levels,
because the benefits of reducing from high to modest
exposures could be greater along the hormetic curve
than along the linear curve (see Cross' Fig. 3, where
H H 2 >H H 1 ).
These are the first implications of hormesis for
regulatory law. But if hormesis is a significant
phenomenon, its ultimate implications may be far
more radical Ð and yet radical in a way that counsels
moderation. This ``radical moderation'' would be
moderate in policy terms but radical because it forces
stark rethinking, even rejection, of some of the core
premises of modern regulation.
First, Cross's argument leads to a more general
point about setting priorities. Observe that Cross's
second result ( hormesis warranting more stringent
regulation ) obtains only where the hormetic curve
has a steeper slope than the linear dose ±response
curve. Where the hormetic curve has a flatter slope
than the linear curve Ð which would be the case as
the hormetic curve approaches its nadir ( the point
Cross refers to as the ``tipping point'') Ð then the
hormetic curve would justify less stringent regulation
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than the linear curve. Where the hormetic curve has a
negative slope Ð which would be the case between
zero exposure and the nadir of the curve Ð then the
benefits of more stringent limits on exposure are
negative, and would justify relaxing regulation.
These inferences support a more general proposition: the health benefits of any reduction in exposure
will vary directly with the slope of the dose ±response
curve in the relevant range of exposures. This
proposition is important whether one accepts the
notion of hormesis or not. Regulators are often urged
to set risk - based priorities, to tackle the ``worst things
first.'' But that advice is incorrect if the dose ±response
curve is not strictly linear Ð even if it is monotonically increasing with dose, and has no hormetic
(negatively sloped) segment. If some ``big'' risks
(large absolute levels of harm ) have flat dose±
response curves near the current exposure ( and are
steep only near zero exposure ), then regulation of
those risks might not ( initially ) accomplish much
health protection. Meanwhile, if some ``smaller'' risks
have steep dose ± response curves near the current
exposure ( and are flat below some level of exposure ),
then regulation of these risks could ( initially )
accomplish much more health protection. Thus, even
apart from hormesis, regulators should not target the
``worst things first'' Ð they should target the ``most
gains first.'' (Accounting for differences in the cost of
control would suggest targeting the ``most gains per
cost first.'' )
Second, hormesis could support more stringent
regulation for an entirely different reason. That is
because purely ``health -based'' regulation ( ignoring
the costs of control ), if based on a linear dose±
response extrapolation, may be unconstitutional.
The D.C. Circuit has held in the American
Trucking case that Congress cannot constitutionally
delegate to the EPA the unlimited power to
regulate air quality anywhere between current
levels and zero; some ``limiting principle'' must
be furnished by EPA to constrain its discretion
within that range.1 If the Supreme court affirms
this holding, EPA will have to come up with some
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such limiting criterion. Hormesis could fit the bill.
If EPA regulates to minimize net risks ( net of the
benefits of low -dose exposures ), instead of just
picking a number without explaining why it did
not pick another number, then EPA may satisfy
the courts' test and save the Clean Air Act from
unconstitutionality.
This reveals a third point: hormesis is a special
case of the more general phenomenon of risk ± risk
trade -offs.2,3 Interventions to reduce a target risk
may increase countervailing risks. Airbags both
save and kill; so do medicines, foods, pesticides,
and hazardous waste cleanups. Hormesis is a
special case, in which the very agent that is
harmful at high doses is protective at low doses.
The more general case includes hormesis as well
as trade - offs in which the regulation controls one
agent but exacerbates another. Often these risk ±
risk trade -offs are worthwhile, but sometimes not,
and in any case the countervailing risks are often
greater than they should be. EPA and other
agencies have resisted acknowledging this reality,
and have regulated with little or no attention to
the countervailing risks of their own risk -prevention efforts ( just as private firms can operate with
scant attention to the external harms they create ).
In Corrosion Proof Fittings, the EPA ban on
asbestos was struck down in part for its neglect
of the risks of highway accidents from inferior
brake linings.4 In the American Trucking case
itself,1 the court ruled that EPA had illegally
neglected the possibility that its efforts to thin
the levels of tropospheric ozone would, while
protecting our lungs, put our skin cells at
increased risk from ultraviolet radiation. Recognizing these trade - offs could improve the net benefits
of regulation, while saving otherwise unbounded
statutes from unconstitutionality.
Fourth, if hormesis is significant, it could, as Cross
foresees, spur regulation requiring minimum exposures. Against our history of restricting maximum
exposures, this seems quite radical. But actually it is
quite common, and can be quite moderate. We
already require minimum doses of fluoride and
chlorine in public drinking water, knowing that
these substances pose harms at high doses but also
that they offer significant public health benefits at
low doses. Likewise, we mandate that children
receive numerous vaccines, even though some of
these vaccines pose risks. Ditto dental X -rays. And
sometimes we set minimum highway speeds as well
as maximum speed limits, where a uniform intermediate speed level is safer than either a high or a
low speed. Many pollution laws can also be understood as imposing exposure minima: laws setting
ambient concentrations limits, emissions limits, re-

quiring specific pollution control technology, and
halting regulation at the limit of industrial feasibility,
all implicitly oblige the public to be exposed in the
short term to the residual discharges that the
government binds itself not to regulate. (As Cross
points out, the feasibility criterion is flawed where it
allows higher levels of pollution than would be
justified under cost ± benefit criteria; the feasible level
would match the hormetic nadir only by coincidence. ) If hormesis is significant, some current
environmental laws could be interpreted to enable
the government to set formal minima as well as
maxima. Section 109 of the Clean Air Act tells EPA
to ``protect the public health with an adequate
margin of safety.'' IF ( a big if ) EPA decides that
some minimum concentration levels are needed to
``protect the public health . . .'' (for example, to
screen out ultraviolet radiation ) , the language of
the Act does not seem to bar that approach.
Fifth, hormesis redefines our notion of ``pollution''
and ``contamination.'' It questions the premise that
``pollutants'' are unmitigated bads. This is radical
because modern environmentalism is built in large
part on the dichotomies of good versus evil, clean
versus dirty, natural versus unnatural.5 Substances
are placed on lists of bads, as under section 112 of
the Clean Air Act. In American Trucking, EPA's brief
explained that it had ignored the ultraviolet - screening benefits of ozone because it thought ``pollutants''
could only have adverse effects.6 Zero discharge is
the express goal of the Clean Water Act, and of
many who advocate the ``precautionary principle.''
Hormesis challenges these premises. Paracelsus
taught us long ago that the dose, not the substance,
makes the poison. And common sense teaches us
that a little bit can be good for us even though a lot
would be bad: vitamins, minerals, medicines, wine,
salt, toothpaste, oxygen, sunshine Ð almost everything ( perhaps even law for society, and humans for
the earth) . In short, moderation is a virtue. Thus
hormesis points to the ``radical moderation'' of risk
regulation. This can be consonant with the values of
environmentalism: think ``small is beautiful,'' and
insert ``dose.''
The most radical implication of hormesis and risk ±
risk trade - offs is the deradicalization of environmental discourse. Things are not either bad or good: they
are both. The world is not a simple battle between
good and evil: it is a series of complex trade -offs
among competing goods, and among countervailing
risks. The hard question is not whether something is
bad or good, it is how much is too much or too little; it
is finding the point of optimality amidst risks on all
sides. The regime we now have is too often radical in
its stark dichotomies; the future may be radical in its
moderation.

Hormesis and the radical moderation of law
JB Wiener

164

References
1 American Trucking Associations v. US EPA. 1999. 175
F.3d 1027 ( D.C. Cir. ) .
2 Graham JD, Wiener JB. Risk versus Risk: Tradeoffs in
Protecting Health and the Environment. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1995.
3 Wiener JB. Managing the iatrogenic risks of risk management. Risk: Health Saf Environ 1998; 9: 39 ± 82.

4 Corrosion Proof Fittings v. US EPA. 1991. 947 F.2d 1201
( 5th Cir. ) .
5 Wiener JB. Beyond the balance of nature. Duke Environ
Law Policy Forum 1996; 7: 1 ± 24.
6 Brief of Respondent US EPA in American Trucking
Associations v. US EPA. 1998. D.C. Cir., No. 97 - 1441
( filed June 22, 1998 ) , pp. 58 ± 60, 62.

